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ICEBERG, RIGHT AHEAD!
A COMPENDIUM OF TITLE ISSUES IN NORTH DAKOTA
BLAINE T. JOHNSON*

ABSTRACT
This article examines the doctrine of after-acquired title, North
Dakota’s Marketable Record Title Act, and the alienation of homestead:
three areas of real property law that on the surface seem simple and easily
applied, but below the surface are fraught with problems and unintended
consequences. Much like the iceberg, what appears on the surface may
look relatively harmless, but what lurks underneath can have serious
repercussions. This analogy not only applies to the comparison between
surface interests and mineral interests, but also to the difference between
well-intended legislation and the resulting impacts that must then be
addressed after a carefully researched analysis of the legislation’s effect on
real property law. This article addresses the history and development of
each of the above-mentioned topics, discusses the current application of
North Dakota real property law in conjunction with recent legislative
changes, and finally suggests changes to the law. More importantly,
however, this article seeks to give practitioners well-reasoned advice for the
development and betterment of their real property practice.

* Blaine T. Johnson is a partner at Crowley Fleck PLLP in Bismarck, North Dakota. He
received his Juris Doctorate from the University of Minnesota Law School. He practices
primarily in energy and natural resources with an emphasis on mineral title examination. He is
also a member of the North Dakota Mineral Title Standards Committee.

338

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 90:337

I.

INTRODUCTION..................................................................338

II.

DOCTRINE OF AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE ......................339
A. HISTORY ..........................................................................339
B. QUITCLAIM DEEDS AND THE DOCTRINE OF
AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE.................................................340
C. THE MAGICAL WORD “GRANT” AND AFTER-ACQUIRED
TITLE ..............................................................................344
D. CARKUFF AND SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION ....................350

III.

MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT ..............................354
A. CREATION OF THE MARKETABLE RECORD
TITLE ACT .......................................................................355
B. ESTABLISHMENT OF A CHAIN OF TITLE ..........................357
C. POSSESSION & 2013 LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS .........365
D. A CALL FOR REFORM ......................................................369

IV.

ALIENATION OF HOMESTEAD ........................................369
A. HISTORY OF HOMESTEAD LAWS .....................................370
B. DEFINITION OF HOMESTEAD ...........................................371
C. ALIENATION OF HOMESTEAD..........................................373
D. ALIENATION OF THE HOMESTEAD
MINERAL ESTATE............................................................376
E. HOMESTEAD APPLICATION IN LIGHT OF NORTH DAKOTA
SURFACE PROTECTION LAWS .........................................379

V.

I.

CONCLUSION ......................................................................382

INTRODUCTION

Most of an iceberg’s volume lies beneath the water’s surface. At first
glance, the tip of the iceberg seems relatively harmless; however, it is what
lies beneath the surface that can wreak havoc when unexpectedly
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encountered. The same is true of real estate law and, in particular, title
examination. This article will examine three common real estate principles:
the doctrine of after-acquired title, North Dakota’s Marketable Record Title
Act, and finally alienation of homestead. To fully understand the basis and
purposes of each principle, this article will first review the history and
development of each. It will then explore in detail those troubling aspects
that lie beneath the surface of superficial, cursory examinations of each
principle. In addition, this article will probe recent changes in legislation
that on the surface appear well meaning, yet upon further review seem to
reach unintended consequences. Regardless of whether such legislation is
repealed, amended, or otherwise adopted for practice, this article seeks to
give practitioners a better understanding of common real estate
principles—both with regard to surface estates and to mineral interests.
II. DOCTRINE OF AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE
At first glance, the doctrine of after-acquired title seems to be a simple
concept. “If, at the time of a conveyance, a grantor does not own all or part
of the interest that the grantor purports to convey, but the grantor later
acquires the interest that was the subject of the earlier conveyance, the
grantor may be estopped from denying the claim of the grantee to the
after-acquired title.”1
The underlying premise of the doctrine of
after-acquired title is that the grantee acquires exactly what was promised
by the grantor. This section will review the history of the doctrine of
after-acquired title, the doctrine as applied to quitclaim deeds, the implied
covenants of the word “grant” and its effect on the doctrine, and finally
recent North Dakota case law and legislation.
A. HISTORY
Derived from the California Civil Code,2 the codification of the afteracquired title doctrine in North Dakota first appears pre-statehood.3
“Where a person purports by proper instrument to grant real property in fee
simple, and subsequently acquires any title or claim of title thereto, the

1. JOYCE PALOMAR, 1 PATTON & PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES § 219 (3d ed. 2014).
2. CAL. CIV. CODE §1106 (West 1872).
3. GEORGE H. HAND, THE REVISED CODES OF THE TERRITORY OF DAKOTA 1877:
COMPRISING THE CODES AND GENERAL STATUTES PASSED AT THE TWELFTH SESSION OF
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, AND ALL OTHER GENERAL LAWS REMAINING IN FORCE 335 (1877).
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same passes by operation of law to the grantee, or his successors.”4 This
codification is based upon a substantial body of longstanding case law.5
The doctrine of after-acquired title has been explained as follows:
The deed, which the grantor engages to warrant and defend, is a
solemn stipulation that the grantor has the title which he is now
about to transfer to the grantee as a purchaser for value. In the
face of this he cannot be heard to say, after making the transfer,
that he had not that title at the time. So his new title lies lifeless in
his hands against such purchaser; the estoppels being a true
conveyance.6
The United States Supreme Court has stated:
“The doctrine is founded, when properly applied, upon the
highest principles of morality, and recommends itself to the
common sense and justice of every one . . . It is a doctrine,
therefore, when properly understood and applied, that
concludes the truth in order to prevent fraud and falsehood,
and imposes silence on a party only when in conscience and
honesty he should not be allowed to speak.”7
“It is just that a party should not be permitted to hold or recover an
estate in violation of his own covenant; and it is wise policy to repress
litigation and to prevent a circuity of actions.”8
B. QUITCLAIM DEEDS AND THE DOCTRINE OF
AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE
Historically, a quitclaim deed was merely a release of any interest the
grantor may have had in the property and did not rise to the level of a
conveyance.9 From a grantee’s perspective, the quitclaim deed is the least

4. Id. See also NORTH DAKOTA REVISED CODE § 47-1015 (1943) (hereinafter N.D.R.C.);
N.D.R.C. § 5529 (1913); N.D.R.C. § 4984 (1905); N.D.R.C. § 3547 (1899); N.D.R.C. § 3547
(1895).
5. See Moore v. Crawford, 130 U.S. 122, 130 (1889) (citing Irvine v. Irvine, 76 U.S. 617,
625 (1869)).
6. See RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK R. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 927 n.4
(1989).
7. VanRensselaer v. Kearney, 52 U.S. 297, 326 (1850).
8. Comstock v. Smith, 13 Mass. (1 Pick.) 116, 119 (Mass. 1832). If a grantor were allowed
to recover property against his grantee, the grantee would be entitled to an action against the
grantor to recover the value of the land. Id.
9. See Carkuff v. Balmer, 2011 ND 60, ¶ 10, 795 N.W.2d 303, 306 (citing Schuman v.
McLain, 61 P.2d 226, 227-28 (Okla. 1936)).
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desirable form of conveyance because it includes no title covenants.10 “The
grantee does not have recourse against the grantor even if he had no interest
in the property. Similarly, the grantee has no recourse if the title is
encumbered by easements, mortgages, judgment liens, or any other
property interests . . . . This type of deed usually is used for more limited
purposes, such as releasing a mortgage, transferring property intrafamily, or
settling a boundary line dispute.”11 Absent fraudulent representations, the
grantor of a quitclaim deed is not responsible for the goodness of the title
beyond the covenants in his deed.12 “A deed of this character purports to
convey, and is understood to convey, nothing more than the interest or
estate of which the grantor is seized or possessed at the time; and does not
operate to pass or bind an interest not then in existence.” 13 After-acquired
title will not, as a general rule, inure to the benefit of the grantee under a
quitclaim deed.14
North Dakota adopted this general rule in Alsterberg v. Bennet.15 In
Alsterberg, the plaintiff alleged that oral promises made by the grantor of a
quitclaim deed were enforceable for the recovery of monetary damages
suffered by the plaintiff in order to satisfy encumbrances against the
property conveyed.16 The North Dakota Supreme Court held that “[o]ne
who accepts a quitclaim deed is, in the absence of fraud, mistake, or other
ground for equitable relief, conclusively presumed to have agreed to take
the title subject to all risks as to defects or [e]ncumbrances, relying on such
protection only as the recording laws afford him.”17 “The absence of
express or implied covenants in a deed is equivalent to an express
declaration therein that the grantor assumes to convey only his right or
interest, whatever it may be, and that he declines to bind himself to do
more.”18
What constitutes a quitclaim deed and whether or not the doctrine of
after-acquired title applies, however, is not always so clear. In Aure v.
Mackoff, Aure owned land in fee simple in Section 19, Township 151
North, Range 95 West, McKenzie County subject to a mortgage to the State
10. BARLOW BURKE, ANN M. BURKHART, & R. H. HELMHOLZ, FUNDAMENTALS OF
PROPERTY LAW 540 (1999).
11. Id.
12. VanRensselaer, 52 U.S. at 322.
13. Id.
14. Bilby v. Wire, 77 N.W.2d 882, 888 (N.D. 1956).
15. 106 N.W. 49 (N.D. 1905).
16. Id. at 50.
17. Id. at 51.
18. Id.
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of North Dakota.19 Subsequently, Aure executed an assignment of royalty
to W. R. Olson purporting to “sell, assign, transfer, convey and set over
unto the said assignee, all of my right, title and interest in and to Ten per
cent (10%) Royalty of all the oil and of all the gas produced and saved.” 20
The assignment of royalty provided that the assignor agreed to warrant and
defend the title to the same.21 The State of North Dakota foreclosed its
mortgage, included the royalty owners in the foreclosure proceeding, and
acquired title to the property by sheriff’s deed dated August 28, 1941.22 A
contract for deed was entered into between the State of North Dakota and
Aures on February 17, 1942 for the purchase of the property.23 The
contract for deed was satisfied and a quitclaim deed was issued by the State
of North Dakota on October 3, 1955, reserving an undivided fifty percent of
all oil, gas, or minerals.24
The issue before the court was whether or not the doctrine of
after-acquired title applied to the assignment of royalty to W. R. Olson.25
The Court found that North Dakota Revised Code section 47-1015 was
inapplicable because the assignment of royalty did not purport to grant real
property in fee simple, only to “sell, assign, transfer, convey and set over
unto the said assignee, all of my right, title and interest in and to Ten
percent (10%) Royalty.”26 The court likened this to a quitclaim deed.27
This is certainly a case in which poor drafting results in poor law. It
appears on the face of the assignment of royalty that the intent of such
instrument was to convey to W. R. Olson an undivided ten percent royalty
interest in the lands. The granting clause contained no words of release or
quitclaim. The inclusion of the “all of my right, title and interest in and to”
was simply superfluous in nature, and it therefore resulted in ambiguity.
The designation of conveyance of a specific interest in all of the oil and all
of the gas produced and saved together in the lands with words of warranty
is much more indicative of a warranty deed in which after-acquired title
would pass. In some regards, the court acknowledged this in its argument
by stating: “The assignment conveyed to Olson the complete and entire
estate in a ten percent royalty. We therefore need not be concerned with the
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

93 N.W.2d 807, 809 (N.D. 1958).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 810.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 810-11.
Id. at 811.
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rule that an estate cannot be enlarged by general warranty.”28 A
conveyance of a specific interest is substantially different from granting “all
of the assignor’s right, title, and interest.” The court recognized, however,
that the conveyance of only the assignor’s right, title and interest was not
necessarily determinative because the assignment of royalty also included
words of warranty.29
The Aure court then held that a true quitclaim deed containing warranty
of title “estops the warrantor from asserting against the grantee or his
assigns any after acquired title derived through any act or conveyance of the
warrantor prior to the deed in question.”30 In support of its proposition, the
court cited Bell v. Twilight, an 1853 case from the New Hampshire
Supreme Court.31 Bell held a mortgage against property owned by
Ebenezer Fitts.32 Bell then executed a quitclaim deed to Twilight in which
he “released, sold, and quitclaimed” the “right, title, interest, estate, and
demand” of Bell in the property together with words of limited warranty of
title.33 Subsequently, Bell acquired a life estate interest in the property
from Hannah Fitts.34 Twilight argued that the quitclaim deed was effective
to convey after-acquired title because of the words of warranty.35 The Bell
court deemed that the warranty was limited in nature to only title derived
and claimed by, from, or under Bell.36 Because the life estate interest was
acquired from other sources, it did not fall under the purview of the limited
warranty.37 Bell never purported to convey more than he had at the time he
executed the deed, and the limited warranty could not be read to be
inconsistent with the grant.38 The court noted that “[i]f the doctrine of
estoppel went as far as was claimed, a party owning a partial title in an
estate could not, by a quitclaim deed, drawn in the most guarded and
specific terms, convey that interest, without at the same time stopping
himself forever from purchasing the residue of the estate, and setting it up
against his grantee.”39
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. (citing Bell v. Twilight, 26. N.H. 401 (N.H. 1853)).
32. Bell, 26 N.H. at 404.
33. Id. (covenanting “to warrant and defend the said granted premises against all claims or
demands of any person claiming by, from, or under [him].”).
34. Id. at 405.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 407.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 410-11.
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The Aure court further cited the Massachusetts case of Comstock v.
Smith to support its position.40 The Comstock court, however, found that
the covenants were restricted covenants and were coextensive with the grant
or the release.41 As such, a limited warranty covenanting against “the
lawful claims and demands of all persons claiming by or under him” did not
vest after-acquired title in the grantee.42 The Comstock court went further
and deemed that the application of the doctrine of after-acquired title to a
restricted conveyance and covenant would be a manifest perversion of the
principle upon which the doctrine is founded.43
The Aure decision likely reached the correct result in passing
after-acquired title to the successors of the assignee. However, the court
should not have deemed the assignment of royalty akin to a quitclaim deed.
In attempting to justify its decision, the court left practitioners with no clear
direction for drafting appropriate conveyances.
C. THE MAGICAL WORD “GRANT” AND
AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE
While a naked quitclaim deed offers no covenants of title, North
Dakota Century Code section 47-19-10 has created implied covenants of
warranty when the word “grant” is used in conveyances, including
quitclaim deeds. North Dakota adopted the statute from California Civil
Code section 1113, enacted in 1872, and it reads as follows:
From the use of the word “grant” in any conveyance by which an
estate of inheritance or fee simple is to be passed, the following
covenants, and none other, on the part of the grantor for the
grantor and the grantor’s heirs and assigns, are implied unless
retrained by express terms contained in such conveyance:
1. That previous to the time of the execution of such
conveyance, the grantor has not conveyed the same
estate, nor any right, title or interest therein, to any person
other than the grantee; and

40. See Aure v. Mackoff, 93 N.W.2d 807, 811 (N.D. 1958) (citing Comstock, 30 Mass. (13
Pick.) 116 (Mass. 1832)).
41. Comstock, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) at 120. (The grantor “agrees to warrant the title granted
or released, and nothing more. That title only he undertook to assert and defend. To extend the
covenant further, would be to reject or do away the restrictive words of it, and to enlarge it to a
general covenant of warranty, against the manifest intention of the parties.”).
42. Id. at 117.
43. Id. at 121.
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That such estate, at the time of the execution of such
conveyance, is free from encumbrances done, made, or
suffered by the grantor, or any person claiming under the
grantor. Such covenants may be sued upon in the same
manner as if they had been inserted expressly in the
conveyance.44
In applying North Dakota Century Code section 47-19-10, the use of
the word “grant” in a conveyance implies limited or restricted covenants of
title rather than a general warranty.
An issue then arises when a deed purporting to convey all of the
grantor’s right, title and interest includes the word “grant” or other
covenants. In Hanrick v. Patrick, the United States Supreme Court
examined a grant deed conveying “one undivided half of all my right, title,
and interest in and to the following described lands . . . .”45 The deed
contained covenants that the grantor was:
lawfully seized of an interest in fee-simple of the granted premises
aforesaid; that they are free from all incumbrances [sic] by me
incurred; and that I have good right to sell and convey the same as
aforesaid, and that I will, and my heirs executors, and
administrators shall, warrant and defend the same to the said
grantee, and to his heirs and assigns, forever, against the lawful
claims and demands of all persons.46
The Supreme Court held:
The covenant of warranty in the deed to Sargent, however,
relates only to the premises granted, which the grantors agree
to warrant and defend, and the premises granted are described
as “one undivided half of all my right, title, and interest in and
to the following described lands,” and cannot, therefore,
operate as an estoppel preventing the grantors from asserting
any subsequently acquired title . . . There is no recital in the
deed to estop her as to the character of her title or the quantum
of interest intended to be conveyed within the rule laid down
by this court in Van Rensseloer v. Kearney, 11 How. 297. In
the absence of such recital, a covenant of general warranty,
where the estate granted is the present interest and title of the

44. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10-19 (2013).
45. Hanrick v. Patrick, 119 U.S. 156, 173 (1886).
46. Id.
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grantor, does not operate as an estoppel to pass a subsequently
acquired title . . . Where the deed, although containing
general covenants for title, does not on its face purport to
convey an indefeasible estate, but only the right, title, and
interest of the grantor, in cases where those covenants are held
not to assure a perfect title, but to be limited and restrained by
the estate conveyed, the doctrine of estoppel has been
considered not to apply; in other words, although the
covenants are, as a general rule, invested with the highest
functions of an estoppel in passing, by mere operation of law,
an after-acquired estate, yet they will lose that attribute when
it appears that the grantor intended to convey no greater estate
than he was possessed of.47
The South Dakota Supreme Court examined a quitclaim deed in which
the grantors “hereby convey, grant, remise, release, and quitclaim unto John
L. Lockhart, trustee for the State of South Dakota, and to his assigns,
forever, all the [their] right, title, estate, interest, property, and equity in and
to the following real property.”48 South Dakota Codified Laws section
43-25-10 concerning the implied covenants that are attached to the word
“grant” is identical to North Dakota Century Code section 47-10-19. In this
case, the South Dakota Supreme Court held that the word “grant” in an
instrument that only conveys the right, title, and interest of the grantor is not
sufficient to convey after-acquired title.49 Following this decision, the
South Dakota legislature codified the application of the after-acquired
doctrine to the implied covenants attributed to the word “grant” so that
“[e]very such instrument, duly executed, shall be a conveyance to the
grantee, his heirs, and assigns, of all right, title, and interest of the grantor in
the premises described, but shall not extend to after-acquired title, unless
words expressing such intention be added.”50
The California Court of Appeals came to a similar conclusion in
Southern Pacific Co. v. Dore.51 The deed in the Dore case contained the
following grant clause:
That the said parties of the first part do by these presents grant,
bargain and sell unto the said party of the second part, and to its

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 175-76.
State v. Kemmerer, 84 N.W. 771, 771 (S.D. 1900).
Id. at 773.
See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-25-8 (1911).
168 P. 147 (Cal. Ct. App. 1917).

2014]

A COMPENDIUM OF TITLE ISSUES

347

successors and assigns forever, all of their right, title and interest
in and to the following tracts . . . .52
California Civil Code section 1113 concerning the implied covenants
that are attached to the word “grant” is identical to North Dakota Century
Code section 47-10-19 and, as noted above, was the basis for the North
Dakota statute.53 The California Court of Appeals refused to apply the
implied covenants to a conveyance of only the grantor’s right, title, and
interest, stating:
According to the plain language of the statute it is only when a
conveyance of an estate of inheritance or a fee simple is to pass
that from the word “grant” a covenant is implied that the land to be
conveyed is free from incumbrances; [sic] and when the
conveyance by its terms merely purports—as does the conveyance
here—to pass all the right, title, and interest of the grantors,
according to the authorities nothing more passes than the estate
which such grantors had in the land at that time subject to all
defects and equities which could have been asserted against the
grantors. In Hull’s Adm’r v. Hull’s Heirs, 35 W.Va. 155, at page
164, 13 S.E. 49, at page 52 (49Am.St.Rep.800), the court says:
Where a deed conveys the grantor’s right, title and interest,
though it contains in general terms a covenant of general
warranty, the covenant is regarded as a restricted one, limited
to the estate conveyed, and not one defending generally the
land described. The covenant of warranty is intended to
defraud only what is conveyed, and cannot enlarge the estate
conveyed.54
Citing numerous other sources, the Dore court found that “it has been
uniformly held that a conveyance of the right, title, and interest of the
grantor vests in the purchaser only what the grantor himself could claim,
and the covenants in such deed, if there were any, were limited to the estate
described.”55

52. Id. at 147.
53. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1113 (West 1917).
54. Dore, 168 P. at 147. The Dore court went on to quote Gee v. Moore, stating “[t]he deed
does not purport to convey the premises in fee simple absolute, so as to bring the instrument
within the provision of the thirty-third section of our statute (section 1113) concerning
conveyances. It only purports to pass all the right, title, and estate, which the grantor possessed in
the land.” Id. (quoting Gee v. Moore, 14 Cal. 472, 474 (1859)).
55. Id. (citing Brown v. Jackson, 16 U.S. 449 (1818); Coe v. Persons Unknown, 43 Me. 432
(Me. 1857); Pike v. Galvin, 29 Me. 183 (Me. 1848); Sweet v. Brown, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 175
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The North Dakota Supreme Court first touched upon the use of the
word “grant” in a quitclaim deed in Frandson v. Casey.56 The quitclaim
deed examined by the court included a granting clause that stated that the
grantor “do[es] hereby convey and quit claim” to the grantee “all right, title
and interest in and to” the described tract.57 The grantee argued that the
quitclaim deed acted to convey all of the described property in fee simple
and was not limited to only the one-third interest owned by the grantor.58
No words of warranty were included in the quitclaim deed.59 The court, in
dicta, noted that the quitclaim deed did not include the word “grant,” which
implies certain covenants.60 Other than the possibility that the court
included such dicta to signal a potentially different outcome had the word
“grant” been included, nothing in the opinion reflects that the use of the
word “grant” would have conveyed after-acquired title, and because the
quitclaim deed had no covenants implied or otherwise, the issue was not
properly before the court.61 Relying upon State v. Kemmerer, the court held
that the quitclaim deed only conveys the interest of the grantor and does not
purport to convey the property.62 Frandson, however, was not a case of
after-acquired title, but one of determining what interest such quitclaim
deed conveyed when no covenants were made. The distinction is important
because of the effect that this case caused on the interpretation of quitclaim
deeds by practitioners.
Prior to the Aure and Frandson decisions, North Dakota Title Standard
1.071 stated as follows:
The use of the word “grant” in a deed which releases and
quitclaims all the grantor’s right, title and interest, or other words
to that affect, does not make such a deed one by which an
after-acquired title will pass.63
In 1978, the North Dakota Title Standards Committee adopted a
change of Title Standard 1.071 to remove the word “not” from the standard:

(Mass. 1846); Allen v. Holton, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 458 (Mass. 1838); Adams v. Cuddy, 13 Pick.
(Mass.) 460 (Mass. 1833); Blanchard v. Brooks, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 47 (Mass. 1831)).
56. 73 N.W.2d 436 (N.D. 1955).
57. Id. at 447.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. (citing State v. Kemmerer, 84 N.W. 771 (S.D. 1900)).
63. N.D. TITLE STANDARDS § 1.017 (N.D. State Bar Ass’n 1961).
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The use of the word “grant” in a deed which releases and
quitclaims all the grantor’s right, title and interest, or other words
to that affect, does make such a deed one by which an
after-acquired title will pass.64
The North Dakota Title Standards Committee cited Kemmerer as
authority for the pre-1978 title standard.65 The North Dakota Title
Standards Committee cited North Dakota Century Code sections 47-10-15
and 47-10-19 as support of both versions of the standard.66 In 1988, the
title standard was renumbered to North Dakota Title Standard 1-08 and
authority cited as North Dakota Century Code sections 47-10-15 and
47-10-19, 162 A.L.R. 556, and Aure v. Mackoff.67
The American Law Report article cited as authority does not support
the contention that the word “grant” will effectively pass title to
after-acquired property when used in a quitclaim deed of all of the grantor’s
right, title, and interest. The article extensively cites cases that confirm that
a generic quitclaim deed will only convey the interest of the grantor at the
time of execution and that after-acquired title will only pass if words of
general warranty are included.68 The majority rule expressed by the article
is found in War Fork Land Co. v. Carr, holding that:
The doctrine prevails that one who conveys, with a covenant of
warranty, land to which he had not the title, but which he
subsequently acquires by deed, devise, or descent, will be estopped
to claim the land against his warrantee, to whom the title thereafter
acquired inured by virtue of the conveyance and covenant of
warranty . . . But that doctrine does not operate to divest a title
subsequently acquired when the deed of conveyance is without
warranty, or is limited to a transfer of the interest owned by the
grantor at the time of the conveyance.69
The article goes on to further note:
A grantor in a deed of the second class, not having assumed to
convey an actual estate and to make it good against all claims
but only to relinquish whatever estate he may have with a
64. N.D. TITLE STANDARDS § 1.017 (N.D. State Bar Ass’n 1978).
65. Id. (citing State v. Kemmerer, 84 N.W. 771 (S.D. 1900)).
66. N.D. TITLE STANDARDS § 1.017 (N.D. State Bar Ass’n 1978); N.D. TITLE STANDARDS
§ 1.017 (N.D. State Bar Ass’n 1961).
67. N.D. TITLE STANDARDS § 1-08 (N.D. State Bar Ass’n 1988).
68. K. A. Drechsler, Annotation, Right or Interests Conveyed by a Quitclaim Deed, 162
A.L.R. 556 (2015) (citing War Fork Land Co. v. Carr, 33 S.W.2d 308 (Ky. 1930)).
69. Id.
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guaranty that he has not given anyone else any claim to it, is
not bound to make any other title or estate good to grantee. If
at the time of his deed, he has suffered no one else to acquire
any rights or claims under him, there can be no breach of his
covenant. After such a deed he is free to acquire other titles
or estates in the same land, and hold them against his grantee,
for he never covenanted against such titles or estates, but only
against the title or estate he conveyed, whatever it was.70
It appears that the North Dakota Title Standards Committee felt that the
limited covenants expressed by the word “grant” were sufficient to meet the
requirements of a deed of conveyance with warranty. This position is
arguably supported by Aure based upon the North Dakota Supreme Court’s
decision to classify the assignment of royalty as a quitclaim deed with
general warranty, and by Frandson, which included dicta suggesting the
word “grant” may have altered the outcome of the Court’s holding. The
North Dakota Supreme Court dealt with this specific issue in the 2011 case
of Carkuff v. Balmer.71
D. CARKUFF AND SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION
In 1953, Alice Carkuff conveyed all of the oil, gas, and other minerals
underlying her property to her four daughters.72 On the same date, she
conveyed by quitclaim deed the surface interest to her son, James Carkuff.73
Four months later, on October 20, 1953, Alice Carkuff executed a quitclaim
deed in which “Alice Carkuff ‘does by these presents GRANT, BARGAIN,
SELL, REMISE, RELEASE and QUIT-CLAIM unto [James Carkuff] . . .
all the right, title, and interest in and to’ the subject property.”74 The
quitclaim deed did not contain a reservation of minerals and was not
restricted to the surface only.75 Through a series of conveyances several
years later, Alice Carkuff reacquired both the surface and the minerals and
then again reconveyed the minerals to her daughters and the surface to her
son.76 The heirs of James Carkuff argued that the October 20, 1953,

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. (quoting Crockett v. Borgerson, 152 A. 407 (Me. 1930)).
2011 ND 60, 795 N.W.2d 303.
Id. ¶ 3, 795 N.W.2d at 304.
Id.
Id. ¶ 13, 795 N.W.2d at 308.
Id. ¶ 4, 795 N.W.2d at 305.
Id.
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quitclaim deed operated to convey after-acquired title to the mineral
interests because of the inclusion of the word “grant” in the conveyance.77
The North Dakota Supreme Court reflected on 23 AM. JUR. 2D Deeds
section 225, which provides:
In determining whether a quitclaim has been created, operative
words of grant or release are subordinated to words defining or
restricting the interest granted. When the entire instrument reveals
an intention to convey the land itself or some definite interest
therein, it is not a quitclaim merely because of the use of the word
“quitclaim,” or the operative words “remise, release, and
quitclaim,” unaccompanied by words of grant. Nevertheless, such
operative words used alone are significant factors; and where only
the grantor’s right, title or interest is quitclaimed, such operative
words are conclusive that the instrument is a quitclaim.
Similarly, the intention of the parties so controls that the use of the
term “grant” does not necessarily designate the character of a
deed, but whether an instrument is a quitclaim deed or a deed of
grant, bargain, and sale that purports to convey the property itself
is to be determined from the whole of the granting clause
contained in the deed.78
In making its decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court cited with
favor the South Dakota decision of State v. Kemmerer.79 The court rejected
the position that the word “grant” transforms the deed into one that would
pass after-acquired title.80 Instead, the court held that while the term
“grant” is used in the deed, it was limited to Alice Carkuff’s “right, title,
and interest” in the property rather than specifically “grant[ing]” the entire
fee to James Carkuff.81 In construing the quitclaim deed in such a manner,
the court held that a quitclaim deed with limited covenants resulting from
the use of the word “grant” does not operate to convey after-acquired title.82
The court made no mention of the North Dakota Title Standards in its
analysis because the parties never asserted that the deed was ambiguous. At
the time that the 1953 quitclaim deed was drafted and executed, North
Dakota Title Standard 1.071 relied on State v. Kemmerer for the proposition

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id. ¶ 11, 795 N.W.2d at 307 (quoting 23 AM. JUR. 2D Deeds § 225 (2002)).
Id. ¶ 13, 795 N.W.2d at 308 (citing State v. Kemmer, 84 N.W. 771, 772 (S.D. 1900)).
Id. ¶ 14.
Id.
Id.

352

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 90:337

that the word “grant” did not convey after-acquired title, further supporting
the likely intent of the parties and confirming the decision of the court.
The Carkuff decision was contrary to North Dakota Title Standard
1.071 as amended in 1978.83 As a result, the North Dakota Title Standards
Committee amended the standard to reflect the court’s holding: “The use of
the word “grant” in a quit claim deed does not, of itself, make the deed on
which passes after-acquired title. The deed on it’s [sic] face as a whole
must be considered to determine the parties’ intent.84
Practitioners’ reliance upon the title standard appears to be the basis for
legislative amendments to North Dakota Century Code section 47-10-15 in
2013 “correcting” the Supreme Court’s holding in Carkuff.85 The
legislature passed Senate Bill 2168 in 2013 to amend North Dakota Century
Code section 47-10-15 as follows:
When a person purports by proper instrument to grant convey real
property in fee simple and subsequently acquires any title or claim
of title thereto to the real property, the same real property passes
by operation of law to the grantee or the grantee’s successors
person to whom the property was conveyed or that person’s
successor. A quitclaim deed that includes the word “grant” in the
words of conveyance, regardless of the words used to describe the
interest in the real property being conveyed by the grantor, passes
after-acquired title. The use of a quitclaim deed, with or without
the inclusion of after-acquired title in the deed, does not create any
defect in the title of a person that conveys real property. This
section applies to any conveyance regardless of when executed.86
The amendment is contrary to well-reasoned case law and decades of
practice—at least prior to 1978. The authority for 1978 title standard was
tenable, which Carkuff confirmed. Admittedly, a simple bright-line rule for
invoking the doctrine of after-acquired title is a good practice if it is in fact
possible. However, it is also good practice to rely upon the common
understanding that a quitclaim deed conveys only the interest of the grantor,
83. N.D. TITLE STANDARDS § 1.071 (N.D. State Bar Ass’n 1978).
84. N.D. TITLE STANDARDS § 1-06 (N.D. State Bar Ass’n 2012).
85. See Hearing on S.B. 2168 Before S. Judiciary Comm., 63rd Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 2
(N.D. 2013) (“The reason for this bill is that the Supreme Court has addressed a case recently that
dealt with a quit claim deed, if the deed utilizes the language grant after acquired title will always
pass. If it does not have the grant language in it it will not pass after acquired title . . . it was
decided to go with what the practice has always been and that is the use of the word grant
whatever the document is would pass after acquired title.”). The Committee Minutes also reflect
the attempt to resolve issues of successive quitclaim deeds being recorded out of order. See id.
86. 2013 N.D. Laws ch. 346, § 1 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10-15 (2013)).
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whatever that may be, and nothing more. Good drafting requires one to
explicitly describe within the instrument the true intent of the parties.
Rather than relying upon the word “grant” in a conveyance to invoke the
after-acquired title doctrine and thereby implying covenants of warranty as
well, it is far better to simply state: “This [insert name of instrument]
conveys all after-acquired title of the [Grantor/Assignor].” The inclusion of
the word “grant” in a true quitclaim deed is unnecessary and may
unintentionally transform the quitclaim deed into a limited warranty deed.
It is noticeably unusual that, as codified, the application of the doctrine
of after-acquired title when invoked by the word “grant” applies only to
quitclaim deeds. It should be noted that the Legislature did not change the
definition of “grant” in North Dakota Century Code section 47-10-19; in
other words, the limited covenants implied by the use of the word “grant”
were not expanded. However, as amended, there is now the potential for
the word “grant” to take on different meanings depending upon the type of
instrument in which it is used.
In addition, the analysis of after-acquired title has always been founded
upon the distinction of whether or not the instrument conveys a fee simple
interest in the lands described or merely the interest of the grantor. Because
the first portion of North Dakota Century Code section 47-10-15 only
passes after-acquired title when the instrument purports to convey real
property in fee simple, the legislative amendments fail to take into account
the situation in which an instrument conveys all of the grantor’s right, title,
and interest in and to the lands described without using the word “grant,”
but includes language of general warranty. As such, it is possible that a
warranty deed without the word “grant” and a quitclaim deed with the word
“grant,” both conveying all of the grantor’s right, title and interest, would
result in the warranty deed not conveying after-acquired title while the
quitclaim deed conveys such title.
This leads to the unanswered question of whether or not the use of the
word “grant” in a mineral deed, assignment of royalty, or any other
instrument of conveyance also conveys after-acquired title. Should the
court take a position that such instruments are akin to a quitclaim deed, as it
concluded in Aure, it will have a tremendous effect on the examination of
mineral title. Historically, it has been commonplace for professional
landmen to acquire oil and gas interests, “grant” various interests to
multiple investors, and then subsequently acquire additional oil and gas
interests in the same lands to be further rationed out. It is also common for
an individual to have conveyed all of her right, title, and interest in oil, gas
and other minerals to a grantee only to subsequently acquire additional
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interest through the estate of a relative, with no intent to convey such afteracquired title. In fact, such situations often did not even contemplate the
grantor acquiring additional interest subsequent to the original conveyance.
Retroactive application of this amendment may misconstrue the actual
intent of the parties to the conveyance and will likely result in more
litigation to determine the outcome of the conveyance.
The North Dakota Supreme Court provided well-reasoned guidance for
its position in Carkuff, which is substantiated by the law of several other
jurisdictions. The Legislature should take serious consideration of the
specific objective of the 2013 amendments and determine whether or not it
is wise to legislate in derogation of the North Dakota Supreme Court’s
holding and whether the legislative amendments truly accomplish such
objective. In addition, the Legislature should contemplate whether or not
the consequences of the adopted language are acceptable or if modifications
would be appropriate.
III. MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT
Marketable title is “title that a reasonable buyer would accept because
it appears to lack any defect and to cover the entire property that the seller
has purported to sell.”87 Marketable title acts are intended to limit the scope
of title examination by cutting off virtually all interests in land that appear
in the public records prior to a given time.88 Nearly twenty states have
enacted some form of marketable record title act.89 This section will
87. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1622 (9th ed 2009). The North Dakota Supreme Court has
defined marketable title as “fee simple, free from litigation, palpable defects, and grave doubts . . .
which will enable the purchaser not only to hold the land in peace . . . but to sell or mortgage it to
a person of reasonable prudence and caution.” Kennedy v. Dennstadt, 154 N.W. 271, 274 (N.D.
1915).
88. GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND
DEVELOPMENT 236-37 (5th ed. 1998). “The name is unfortunate, for such acts neither declare
anybody’s title to be marketable nor define marketability.” Id. Indeed the Model Act notes that
the term “marketable record title” as proposed by the Model Act does not mean title which a
vendee would be compelled to accept, but simply that the forty-year title extinguishes all prior
interests, subject to very few exceptions. See LEWIS M. SIMES & CLARENCE B. TAYLOR, THE
IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING BY LEGISLATION 11 (1960).
89. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 47-33b to 47-33i (2004); FLA. STAT. §§ 712.01 to 712.10 (2000);
735 III. COMP. STAT. 5/13-118 (2003); IND. CODE §§ 32-20-3-1 to 32-20-4-3 (2002); IOWA CODE
§§ 614.29 to 614.38 (1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-3401 to 58-3412 (2005); MICH. COMP.
LAWS §§ 565.101 to 565.109 (2006); MINN. STAT. § 541.023 (2000); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-288
to 76-298 (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 47B-1 to 47B-9 (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-19.1-01 to
47-19.1-11 (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5301.47 to 5301.56 (2004); OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, §
71 (1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 34-13.1-1 to 34-13.1-11 (1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 43-30-1
to 43-30-17 (2007); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-9-1 to 57-9-10 (West 2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27,
§§ 601 to 606 (2006); WIS. STAT. § 893.33 (1996); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-10-101 to 34-10-109
(2007). Some other states have limitations provisions that could apply to particular claims. For
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examine the creation of Martketable Record Title Acts, the establishment of
a chain of title necessary to comply with the Marketable Record Title Act,
the requirement of possession, and recent legislative amendments
specifically affecting mineral interests.
A. CREATION OF THE MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT
Michigan legislation, adopted in 1945, formed the precursor of the
“Model Marketable Title Act,” which Lewis M. Simes and Clarence B.
Taylor first proposed in 1960.90 The impetus for the Model Act was the
simple fact that the mere passage of time causes the chain of title to grow
longer and longer.91 In addition, “[i]ncreased business activity, population
mobility, home ownership, mortgage financing, population growth and the
shift from rural to urban land patterns have increased the volume of title
activity that puts a strain on the present recording system and conveyancing
practice.”92 As a result, the practice of title examination becomes less and
less efficient and far more costly.93 The Model Act sought to shorten the
length of the record required in order to determine marketable title.94 Most
states require an unbroken chain of forty years to establish marketable
title.95 The Uniform Marketable Title Act, as approved and recommended
for enactment by the National Conference of Commissions on Uniform
State Laws, proposed a thirty-year chain of title be required to establish
marketable title.96
The Model Act requires an owner to given notice of a claim to preserve
his or her interest.97 If no such notice appeared of record during the
requisite period of time, then all conflicting claims based upon any title

example, California has a modified version of a marketable title act that limits certain kinds of
claims based on old records. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 880.020 to 887.010 (West 2007).
90. Ted. J. Fiflis, The Improvement of Conveyancing by Legislation. By Lewis M. Simes &
Clarence B. Taylor. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Law School, 1960, 70 YALE L.J. 1409,
1410 (1961) (reviewing LEWIS M. SIMES & CLARENCE B. TAYLOR, THE IMPROVEMENT OF
CONVEYANCING BY LEGISLATION (1960)).
91. Id. at 3.
92. John F. Hicks, The Oklahoma Marketable Record Title Act Introduction, 9 TULSA L.J.
68, 69 (1973).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See discussion supra note 89. The “Model Act” recommended such a forty-year period
suggesting that the requisite period must be long enough to avoid the filing of many claims and
the deprivation of substantial interests by the operation of the statute. SIMES & TAYLOR, supra
note 89, at 5.
96. See UNIF. MARKETABLE TITLE ACT (1990).
97. See SIMES & TAYLOR, supra note 89, at 3.
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transaction prior to the requisite period were extinguished.98 This
effectively worked to eliminate satisfied but unreleased mortgages, titles by
adverse possession, equitable titles, future interests, and other stale claims.99
In 1951, the Marketable Record Title Act (“MRTA”) became law in
North Dakota.100 The legislative purpose identified in North Dakota
Century Code section 47-19.1-10 is consistent with the reasoning behind
the Model Act.101 The MRTA defines marketable title as follows:
Any person that has an unbroken chain of title to any interest in
real estate and that person’s immediate or remote grantors under a
conveyance or other title transaction that has been of record for a
period of twenty years or longer, and is in possession of the
interest, is deemed to have a marketable record title to the interest,
subject solely to the claims or defects that are not extinguished or
barred by the application of this chapter, instruments that have
been recorded less than twenty years, and encumbrances of record
not barred by the statute of limitations.102
As originally enacted, the MRTA required an unbroken chain of thirty
years.103 In 1957, the Legislature amended the MRTA to reduce the
necessary time period to twenty years, making it one of the shortest time
periods required in the United States to establish an unbroken chain of
title.104 An early analysis of North Dakota’s MRTA suggested that the
MRTA could bar the following common claims:
98. Id.
99. Id. at 4.
100. 1951 N.D. Sess. Laws 397. See also N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 47-19.1 (2013).
101. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19.1-10 (2013) (providing “[t]his chapter shall be construed to
effect the legislative purpose of simplifying and facilitating real estate title transactions by
allowing persons to deal with the record title owner as defined herein and to rely upon the record
title covering a period of twenty years or more subsequent to the recording of a deed of
conveyance as set out in section 47-19.1-01, and to that end to bar all claims that affect or may
affect the interest thus dealt with, the existence of which claims arises out of or depends upon any
act, transaction, event or omission occurring before the recording of such deed of conveyance,
unless a notice of such claim, as provided in section 47-19.1-05, shall have been duly filed for
record. The claims hereby barred shall mean any and all interest of any nature whatever, however
denominated, whether such claims are asserted by a person sui juris or under disability, whether
such person is or has been within or without the state, and whether such person is natural,
corporate, private or governmental.”).
102. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19.1-01 (2013).
103. See 1951 N.D. Laws ch. 280.
104. 1957 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 312, § 1; see also SIMES & TAYLOR, supra note 89, at xxiv
(explaining that “if the period stated in the Model Marketable Title Act were changed from forty
years to five or ten years, entirely different consequences would follow. Instead of extinguishing
stale claims which have no real validity, it would tend to extinguish all sorts of live claims and
interests. And large numbers of notices would constantly be filed to keep claims alive.”); Gardner
Cromwell, The Improvement of Conveyancing in Montana by Legislation—A Proposal, 22 MONT.
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(1) A claim arising under tax title which is more than 30 years
old.
(2) A defective quiet title action, mortgage foreclosure, probate
proceeding, or sale under a judgment.
(3) A deed executed by a husband or wife only without stating
that it does not cover homestead.
(4) Informalities in the execution or acknowledgement of
conveyances.
(5) Interests which are present or future, vested or contingent with
the exception of the reversionary interest of a lessor or his
successor and the rights of remaindermen upon expiration of a life
estate or trust created prior to the date of the recording of the
conveyance under which title is claimed.105
B. ESTABLISHMENT OF A CHAIN OF TITLE
The definition of “Title Transaction” is extraordinarily broad, meaning:
any transaction affecting title to real estate, including by will or
descent from any person who held title of record at death, title by a
decree or order of any court, title by tax deed or by trustee’s
referee’s, guardian’s executor’s, or sheriff’s deed as well as by
direct conveyance or reservation.106
Courts have held a variety of instruments qualify as a title
transaction.107 In Dennison v. North Dakota Department of Human
Services, the North Dakota Supreme Court reasoned that, because a
homestead statement was entitled to be recorded pursuant to North Dakota
Century Code section 50-07-07 (1943), and that under North Dakota
L. REV. 26, 29 (1960) (“A relatively short period, however, may have the effect of cutting off live
and timely claims (easements or mortgages, for example) simply because the holders failed to
record a notice.”).
105. James E. Leahy, The North Dakota Marketable Record Title Act, 29 N.D. L. REV. 265,
270 (1953). It should be noted that that the article was written at a time when the unbroken chain
was required to cover a period of thirty years; the mere act of stating the property conveyed is not
homestead within the conveyance is insufficient for the purposes of North Dakota Title Standard
2-02. See N.D. TITLE STANDARDS § 2-02 (N.D. State Bar Ass’n 2012).
106. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19.1-02 (2013). Note, “or reservation” was included in 2013.
See 2013 N.D. Laws ch. 351, § 2.
107. See generally Mizla v. Depalo, 438 A.2d 820, 820 (Conn. 1981) (finding a warranty
deed creating an easement constituted a title transaction); Heifner v. Bradford, 446 N.E.2d 440,
440 (Ohio 1983) (holding a probated will constituted a title transaction); Eisenbarth v. Reusser, 18
N.E.3d 477 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014) (holding an oil and gas lease is a title transaction affecting real
estate); Hazard v. East Hills, Inc., 45 A.3d 1262 (R.I. 2012) (special master found that a boundary
line agreement was a title transaction).
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Century Code section 47-19-01 any instrument affecting the title to or
possession of real property is entitled to be recorded, it followed that the
Legislature intended a homestead statement to be an instrument affecting
title to or possession of property.108 This reasoning, however, is not fully
inclusive.
For instance, a warranty deed with an improper
acknowledgement is not entitled to be recorded, but on occasion is
mistakenly accepted by the recorder.109 Such an improperly recorded
instrument should still be an instrument affecting title. In Marshall v.
Hollywood, the Florida Supreme Court held the term “affects title” did not
carry the narrow meaning of “changing or altering,” but the broader
meaning of “concerning” or “producing an effect upon.”110 The court
further reasoned that a void instrument would affect land titles by casting a
cloud or doubt thereon.111
It is not, however, a mere title transaction that commences the clock on
establishing a twenty-year unbroken chain of title. North Dakota defines
“unbroken chain” as follows:
A person is deemed to have the unbroken chain of title to an
interest in real estate when the records of the county recorder
disclose a conveyance or other title transaction of record twenty
years or more which purports to create the interest in that person or
that person’s immediate or remote grantors, with nothing
appearing of record purporting to divest that purported interest.112
It is the conveyance or other title transaction “which purports to create
the interest in that person” that has been of record more than twenty
years.113 Practitioners commonly refer to such instrument as the “root
deed” or “root of title.”114 Courts and commentators have explained the
root of title concept as follows:
[T]hat conveyance or other title transaction in the chain of title of a
person, purporting to create the interest claimed by such person,
upon which he relies as a basis for the marketability of his title,
and which was the most recent to be recorded as of a date
108. 2002 ND 39, ¶ 1, 640 N.W.2d 447, 449.
109. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19-03 (2013); but see N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-04-01 (2013)
(curing defects in acknowledgments when such instrument has been of record for a period of five
years).
110. 224 So. 2d 743, 749 (Fla. 1969).
111. Id.
112. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19.1-02(1) (2013).
113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. Id.
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twenty-three years prior to the time when marketability is being
determined. The effective date of the “root of title” is the date on
which it is recorded.115
The root of title need only purport to create or convey an interest,
which means that the grantor need not have actually owned the property to
qualify as a root deed.
Courts have taken contrary positions in determining what may be a root
deed. In Marshall v. Hollywood, the Florida Supreme Court affirmatively
answered a certified question confirming that a forged deed or “wild deed”
could constitute a root deed.116 The Marshall case specifically examined
the ability of a forged deed to divest the true owners of the property when
the forgery had been of record the requisite period of time. 117 The true
owners of the property did not discover the forgery until some forty-two
years later, and the true owners had failed to record any notice.118 After
amicus curiae from the Florida Bar and significant analysis of the purpose
of the Marketable Record Title Act, the court stated that to determine a
forged or wild deed could not act as a root deed “would be to disembowel
the Act through a case dealing with a factual situation of a nature precisely
contemplated and remedied by the Act itself. This we cannot do.”119
The Ohio Court of Appeals arrived at the same conclusion in Straits v.
Shepler.120 In Straits, Alvina Sprague conveyed the surface by deed to Fred
W. Waters, reserving all oil and gas in 1916.121 In 1936, Waters conveyed
the property by deed without being subject to the prior reservation of oil
and gas.122 Sprague died in 1957 with her will being probated and several
affidavits for transfer and record of real estate inherited identifying her as
devisee placed of record.123 This resulted in competing chains in which the
1936 deed from Waters was deemed a wild deed with regard to the oil and
gas interests. The court held that a wild deed could in fact constitute a root
deed, reasoning as follows:

115. Obermiller v. Baasch, 823 N.W.2d 162, 170-71 (Neb. 2012) (quoting Gregory B.
Bartles, Comment, The Nebraska Marketable Title Act: Another Tool in the Bag, 63 NEB. L. REV.
124, 136 (1984)).
116. Marshall v. Hollywood, Inc., 236 So. 2d 114, 120 (Fla. 1970).
117. Id. at 116.
118. Id. at 117
119. Id. at 120.
120. No. CA 332, 1982 WL 2919, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 10, 1982).
121. Id. at *3.
122. Id. at *4.
123. Id.
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[S]ince the purpose of the marketable title statutes is to eliminate
the need for searching back to the sovereign, such statutes are not
concerned with the quality of the title conveyed by the root. So
long as the instrument serving as the root of title purports to
convey an interest, it is effective to extinguish prior claims and
interests. Thus, it is possible even for the grantee of a complete
stranger to divest the title of the record owner.124
Wyoming has also recognized a wild deed as the root of title.125 In
Estherholdt, Continental Livestock Co. owned real property and conveyed
the parcel in question to its president, J.A. Reed, in 1946.126 In 1967, an
easement was granted to Utah Power and Light Co.127 The easement was
executed by J. A. Reed as president of Continental Livestock Co., rather
than in his individual capacity.128 At the time of the easement, Continental
Livestock Co. had no interest in the property.129 Citing a law review article
from two University of Wyoming College of Law professors, the court
noted that “[t]he Act is capable of . . . recognizing a new title, free of all
prior claims and defects, in a grantee holding under a wild or maverick
deed.”130 The Esterholdt court went on to find that nothing “in the Act . . .
suggests that a wild deed cannot be the root of title for a contestant in a
controversy under the Act. In fact, such an interpretation would render the
methodology of the Act pointless.”131
Oklahoma, however, refuses to extend such treatment to forged deeds,
finding that such deeds fall under the “inherent-defect” exception to the
state’s marketable title act and holding that a forged conveyance is
ineffective as a muniment of title for any purpose.132 The Mobbs court,
however, did find a void tax deed that met with explicit legislative
approbation was an effective muniment of title and did qualify as a valid
root of title.133 In Exchange National Bank of Chicago v. Lawndale

124. Id. at *8 (quoting Walter E. Barnett, Marketable Title Acts-Panacea or Pandemonium?,
53 CORNELL L. REV. 45, 57 (1967)) (emphasis contained in original).
125. Esterholdt v. Pacificorp, 301 P.3d 1086, 1091 (Wyo. 2013).
126. Id. at 1087.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1091 (citing Gary B. Conine & Daniel J. Morgan, The Wyoming Marketable Title
Act—A Revision of Real Property Law, XVI LAND & WATER L. REV. 181, 199 (1981)).
131. Id.
132. Mobbs v. City of Lehigh, 655 P.2d 547, 552 (Okla. 1982).
133. Id.
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National Bank of Chicago, two competing chains of title existed.134 The
Illinois Supreme Court held that in such cases of competing chains, a chain
of title could not be founded upon a wild deed.135
Wilson v. Kelley held that a quitclaim deed that conveyed all of the
grantor’s interest did not constitute a root deed, finding that “clearly a
quitclaim deed is a title transaction, but it appears that it is not possible to
determine what estate it purports to transfer.”136 The court held that the
ordinary “quitclaim deed only purported to transfer whatever interest the
grantor may have had in the land,” and therefore, “it was impossible to
determine from the face of the instrument what interest or estate in land it
‘purported to convey.’”137 However, “a quitclaim deed can serve as a root
of title if it evidences an intent to convey an identifiable interest in the
land.”138 The court further held that the lack of warranty was not fatal to
the application of the marketable title act.139
Nebraska courts have made the same determination. In Smith v.
Bendberich, the owner of an undivided one-tenth interest in the real
property delivered a quitclaim deed to the grantee without covenant,
warranty, or recital showing an intention not to limit the interest affected by
the conveyance to that which the grantor then owned.140 The grantee then
died and, through administration of the estate, the heirs of the grantee were
assigned the entire tract of land.141 The trial court held that the quitclaim
deed satisfied the requirements of the Marketable Title Act.142 On appeal,
the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the trial court,
holding that a quitclaim deed purports to convey nothing more than the
interest or estate of the property described of which grantor is
possessed—rather than the property itself. Because the quitclaim deed did
not purport to create, in the grantee, an entire title to the land, it was not the
kind of conveyance that complies with the conditions of the Marketable
Title Act.143 Nebraska has nearly identical language in its Marketable Title
134. Exchange Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Lawndale Nat. Bank of Chicago, 243 N.E.2d 193,
193 (1968).
135. Id. at 196
136. Wilson v. Kelley, 226 So. 2d 123, 128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Smith v. Berberich, 95 N.W.2d 325, 326-27 (Neb. 1959).
141. Id. at 326.
142. Id. at 327-28.
143. Id. at 329. The terms of the granting clause of the quitclaim deed were “That the said
party of the first part . . . by these presents do grant, convey, remise, release, and forever
quit-claim unto the said party of the second part, and to her heirs and assigns forever, all his right,
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Act as North Dakota.144 Professor Walter E. Barnett further discussed the
concept of a quitclaim deed in his early analysis of the marketable title act:
Actually a bare quit claim deed of “all of grantor’s right, title, and
interest in and to Blackacre” probably could not serve as a root of
title to Blackacre, because under Model Act § 8(e) the root of the
title must “purport to create the interest claimed” by the
marketable record title holder. A bare quitclaim does not purport
to create any specific interest in the grantee. Smith v. Berberich,
168 Neb. 142, 95 N.W.2d 325 (1959). The mere absence of
warranty covenants, however should not prevent a quitclaim deed
from serving as a root of title when it evidences an intent to
convey the land. For example, some jurisdictions hold that an
after-acquired title will inure to the benefit of the grantee of such a
quitclaim deed. [cites omitted] Similarly, although a judicial
determination of heirship and a probate of a will are title
transactions within the meaning of the acts, neither could serve as
a root of title if it did not purport to establish an interest in the
specific land in question. A will, however, might well contain a
specific devise of particular land; and thus 40 years after probate
the devisee would obtain protection, unavailable to him through
the recording acts, against prior unrecorded grants from the
testator.145
One may argue that the specific interest conveyed by a quitclaim deed,
personal representative’s deed, or other similar instrument that purports to
convey all of the grantor’s or decedent’s interest can, in fact, be determined
simply by examining the interest owned by the grantor or decedent.
However, the underlying purpose of the MRTA—to shorten the period of
time for which title must be examined—is completely defeated by such a
proposition. In many ways, the MRTA creates an inverse title examination;
title, interest, estate, claim and demand, both at law and in equity, of, in and to the following
described real estate . . .” Id.
144. Id. See generally NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-289 (2003); SIMES & TAYLOR, supra note 89,
at 347-349.
145. Walter E. Barnett, Marketable Title Acts—Panacea or Pandemonium?, 53 CORNELL L.
REV. 45, 58 n.40 (1967). Model Act section 8(e) states:
“Root of title” means that conveyance or other title transaction in the chain of title of a
person, purporting to create the interest claimed by such person, upon which he relies
as a basis for the marketability of his title, and which was the most recent to be
recorded as of a date forty years prior to the time when marketability is being
determined. The effective date of the ‘root of title’ is the date on which it is recorded.
SIMES & TAYLOR, supra note 89, at 10. This definition is substantially similar to that
promulgated in North Dakota. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19-1-02(1) (2013).
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that is to say, instead of examining title from its inception, the title
examiner begins with the current owner or owners of record and works
backwards to establish a twenty-year chain of title.146 A title examiner
simply cannot establish a chain of title of unknown quantity.
This process is relatively simple with regard to surface ownership. It is
uncommon to have more than a few owners of the surface at any given
time. As a result, the interest of any particular owner is often easy to
calculate. Conveyances of the surface typically describe the lands or the
grantor’s precise interest in those lands being conveyed. That is not the
case with mineral interests, which are often highly fractionated, sometimes
having hundreds of owners in a single tract.
Mineral title examiners frequently come across common drafting errors
relating to quantity of interest that result in clouds upon title. For instance,
assume that Mineral Owner A conveys an undivided 1/10 interest in
Blackacre to Mineral Owners B, C, and D in equal shares. Mineral Owner
B consults with his divorce attorney in Arizona, who claims to be able to
draft deeds in North Dakota. Said attorney drafts a deed and copies
verbatim the legal description of the prior conveyance being “an undivided
1/10 interest in Blackacre,” despite the fact that Mineral Owner B only
owns an undivided 1/30 interest in Blackacre. This scrivener’s error now
has the potential to become a root deed and eliminate other interests,
assuming that all other aspects of the MRTA are met.
Numerous complications also exist in tracts with aliquot parts. As an
example, Mineral Owner A owns five net mineral acres in the NE¼ of
Section 1 and intends to convey all of his interest to Mineral Owner B.
Mineral Owner A conveys by Mineral Deed an undivided 5/160 interest in
the NE¼. The NE¼ of Section 1 is unlikely to contain exactly 160 acres,
resulting in either an under-conveyance or over-conveyance of Mineral
Owner A’s interest.
Additionally, many clients do not know the specific quantity of mineral
interest. This is especially true in probate matters where a grandchild may
be attempting to administer the estate of a grandparent who died several
decades prior. Standard form mineral deeds typically include a space for
inserting the precise interest being conveyed.147 However, because of
issues concerning unknown quantity of interest and the high probability of
146. See Johnathan M. Starble, Navigating Connecticut’s Marketable Record Title Act: A
Roadmap for the Practitioner, 81 CONN. B. J. 369, 372 (2007).
147. See JOHN S. LOWE, OWEN L. ANDERSON, ERNEST E. SMITH, & DAVID E. PIERCE,
FORMS MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW 210-14 (5th ed.
2008).
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misstating the actual interest owned, practitioners have often turned to
conveying all or some fraction of the grantor’s interest, such as the
following language:
Grantor does hereby grant, convey, transfer and assign unto the
Grantee all of the Grantor’s undivided interest in and to all of the
oil, gas, and other minerals, in and under and that may be produced
from the following described real property.
Although this issue has yet to be examined by the North Dakota
Supreme Court, these broad conveyances fail to precisely describe what
interest is purportedly conveyed, and it is unlikely such conveyances would
be found acceptable as a root deed establishing an unbroken chain of title.
Recently, some practitioners have sought means of avoiding probate by
use of the MRTA. While “title transaction” is defined to include “any
transaction affecting title to real estate, including by will or descent from
any person who held title of record at death,” the means of fulfilling the
MRTA requirements by such methods are uncommon.148 Proof of Death
and Affidavits of Heirship are insufficient for purposes of the MRTA.
Simes notes this fact:
Obviously, there are distinct limits to the use of affidavits. They
cannot supply a deed of conveyance in the chain of title where
none has been executed. They are not conveyances, but are only
instruments for the preservation of rebuttable evidence of certain
facts . . . It may also be said that affidavits should not be used to
establish facts which could much more satisfactorily be established
by other means. Thus the Iowa court, in applying a very broad
affidavit statute, refused to permit its use as a substitute for
administration of a decedent’s estate, where the decedent had died
recently and there was no reason why administration was not
practicable.149
Simes further notes that some jurisdictions have no provision for a
judicial proceeding to determine heirship, and in such cases affidavits may
be relied on for such purposes.150 “In some jurisdictions, at least as to an
earlier state of the law, this may be necessary, since, in effect, the affidavit
of heirship was a standard muniment of title just as the decree determining
heirship is in many states today. If such is the state of the local law, the
148. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19.1-02(2) (2013).
149. SIMES & TAYLOR, supra note 89, at 58 (citing Siedel v. Snider, 44 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa
1950)).
150. Id. at 62.
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model acts should be modified accordingly.”151 North Dakota, however,
has adopted the Uniform Probate Code, which provides for judicial
determination of heirs in intestate proceedings.152 North Dakota Title
Standard 12-01 provides that “persons not claiming through a will may
establish their title by proof of the decedent’s ownership and death and their
relationship to the decedent. The determination of title must be made by an
order of the court.”153 Alternatively, a personal representative may be
appointed to confirm title to the assets of the estate in such heirs or
devisees.154
One can imagine scenarios in which the MRTA may apply to estate
proceedings. For instance, a personal representative’s deed of distribution
from a foreign domiciliary personal representative whose powers have not
been established in North Dakota and which specifies the interest conveyed
would be treated no differently than a wild deed. Similarly, a deed from an
unadjudicated heir purporting to convey an identifiable interest in land may
act as a root deed. Instances such as this will be rare and will be further
complicated by the potential for competing chains of ownership.
C. POSSESSION & 2013 LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS
Neither the Michigan act nor the Model Act require that the person
claiming title be in possession.155 Instead, in the Model Act, possession is
treated as a shield for the owner of record to fend off claims of those
attempting to invoke the act.156 North Dakota, along with South Dakota
and Nebraska, requires possession by the claimant and provides explicitly
for the filing of an affidavit to evidence such possession of record.157 The
specific language of the Act requires that the claimant “is in possession of

151. Id.
152. See generally N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 30.1 (2013).
153. N.D. TITLE STANDARDS § 12-01 (State Bar Ass’n N.D. 2012).
154. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-12-08(4) (2011)).
155. SIMES & TAYLOR, supra note 89, at 347.
156. Id. Section 4(b) of the Model Act provides:
[If] the same record owner of any possessory interest in land has been in possession
of such land continuously for a period of forty years or more, during which period no
title transaction with respect to such interest appears of record in his chain of title, and
no notice has been filed by him or on his behalf as provided in Subsection (a), and
such possession continues to the time when marketability is being determined, such
period of possession shall be deemed equivalent to the filing of the notice immediately
preceding the termination of the forty-year period described in Subsection (a).
Id. at 8.
157. Id. at 347.
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the interest.”158 The purpose of such a requirement, in contrast to the
Model Act, appears to be an attempt to protect the interests of a senior
grantee out of possession from being cut off by a junior grantee who is also
out of possession.159
The available case law concerning possession only acts to define
situations in which no possession is found. In Taylor v. Pennington County,
certain landowners sought to enjoin the construction of a paved county
highway over an existing dirt road. The county road was established in
1901 by petition and was consistently used as a public roadway. The
county failed to record the notice required to preserve its interest under the
Marketable Title Act. However, the South Dakota Supreme Court held that
the landowners were not able to invoke the Marketable Title Act because
they were not in possession of the easement. In making its decision, the
court noted that the South Dakota act differed from other marketable title
statutes that did not require the person invoking the statute to be in
possession of the property.
The North Dakota Supreme Court has held that in order to invoke the
MRTA one who claims the interest must be in possession of the interest
claimed. Thus, in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Advance Realty Co., the
court held that possession of the surface did not constitute possession of the
severed minerals, and therefore, the MRTA would not cut off an
outstanding mineral interest.160 “A mere claim, for whatever time,
unaccompanied by actual possession, can give no right under the statute.”161
Furthermore, the court held that actual possession was required: “the oil and
gas leases . . . while evidence of possession, do not constitute actual
possession sufficient for adverse possession of the severed mineral
interest.”162 Prior to 2013, actual possession required production of the
mineral estate.163
In 2013, the North Dakota Legislature enacted amendments to the
MRTA that extended the benefits of the MRTA to severed mineral
owners.164 North Dakota Century Code section 47-19.1-02(2) now
expressly includes the reservation of minerals in defining “title
158. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19.1-01 (2013).
159. Barnett, supra note 146, at 63.
160. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Advance Realty, 78 N.W.2d 705, 719 (N.D. 1956).
161. Sickler v. Pope, 326 N.W.2d 86, 93 (N.D. 1982) (citing Bilby v. Wire, 77 N.W.2d 882,
889-90 (N.D. 1956)).
162. Id.
163. See generally 2012 N.D. Att’y Gen. Op. 2012-L-11.
164. 2013 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 351, § 1; see also Ken G. Hedge, North Dakota—Oil & Gas,
MIN. L. NEWSL. 23 (Rocky Mt. Min. Law Foundation 2013).
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transaction.”165 Possession may be established by affidavit. Formerly the
affidavit need only include the legal description of the real estate and reflect
that the record titleholder is in possession of such real estate.166 As
amended, the affidavit must show that the person is in possession of the
interest in real estate.167 Although this seems to be a minor detail, it now
appears that the affidavit must describe what exactly is being claimed. The
most substantive change to the MRTA is found in the last sentence of North
Dakota Century Code section 47-19.1-07:
For the purpose of this chapter, the fact of possession of an interest
in real estate referred to in section 47-19.1-01 may be shown of
record by one or more affidavits containing the legal description of
the real estate and showing that the person is in possession of the
interest in real estate. The recorder shall record the affidavits in
the miscellaneous records and index the same against the real
estate. An affidavit of possession may not be filed before the
expiration of twenty years from the recording of the conveyance or
other title transaction under which title is claimed. The holder of
an interest in severed minerals is deemed in possession of the
minerals if that person has used the minerals as defined in section
38-18.1-03 and the use is stated in the affidavit of possession
provided for in this section.168
A mineral interest is now deemed to be in possession if it falls under
one of the provisions of “use” as defined by the Dormant Mineral Act. A
mineral interest is deemed to be used when (1) there is actual production;
(2) when the mineral is subject to a lease, mortgage, assignment, or
conveyance of the mineral interest; (3) the interest is subject to an order to
pool or unitize; (4) taxes are paid on the mineral interest by the owner or the
owner’s agent; or (5) a statement of claim is recorded.169 There is no case
law that defines what is actually required of possession; specifically, it is
ambiguous if the MRTA requires continuous possession or simply
possession of the interest at the time in which the claim is made. The
legislative adoption of “uses” under the Dormant Mineral Act to define
possession only raises serious questions as to its application. For instance,
if continuous possession is required during the twenty year unbroken chain,

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19.1-02(2) (2013).
2013 N.D. Laws ch. 351, § 4.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19.1-07 (2013).
Id.
See N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-18.1-03 (2013).
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will brief periods in which the mineral interest is not leased invalidate a
claim under the MRTA? Or, if the mineral interest is unleased, but the
claimant files a statement of claim two years prior to invoking the
marketable title act, does he or she still have possession?
“The actual possession requirement previously established by North
Dakota case law with respect to the [MRTA] served a legitimate purpose, as
it does with adverse possession claims.”170 The uses expounded upon in the
Dormant Mineral Act were designed to prevent the forfeiture of a real
property interest by requiring minimal efforts from their owners. The
inclusion of these same uses in the MRTA now allows strangers to
substantiate possession of a mineral interest and potentially wrangle title of
the minerals from legitimate owners with the same minimal effort. By
defining possession by these various uses, the Legislature has created a
situation that will increase unmarketability.
In the past, producers of mineral interests exercising sound business
practices would obtain title opinions covering the real property—typically
before commencing operations—but at the very least, before distribution of
royalty interests. Conveyances or leases of mineral interests from strangers
to title would often be identified in the title opinion but could be
“disregarded, unless a title examiner has actual notice or knowledge
(through sources other than the record) of the interest of the grantor.”171
This process acted in some ways as a safeguard from errant claims. Now, if
a mineral deed appears of record with an error in the legal description
followed by a statement of claim relying upon the incorrect legal
description, and perhaps then a lease, these errant instruments cannot be
disregarded because they have the ability to ripen into actual title by way of
the MRTA. This problem is compounded by the fractionated nature of
mineral interests. It becomes difficult, if not impossible, for a mineral
owner to know if a claimant under the MRTA is making a claim against his
or her mineral interest or the mineral interest of another.
The North Dakota Supreme Court has cautioned against the use of oil
and gas leases in the context of adverse possession, holding that while
leases may offer evidence of possession, they do not constitute actual

170. Hedge, supra note 164, at 24 (explaining “[a]ctual possession of a surface estate is
open and visible to the whole world, such that if someone has actual possession of the surface
estate for a period in excess of 20 years, and bases their claim on an instrument of record for more
than 20 years, one can feel fairly confident that there are no other legitimated adverse claimants to
the land.”).
171. N.D. TITLE STANDARDS § 2-01 (State Bar Ass’n N.D. 2012).
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possession sufficient for adverse possession.172 “To hold otherwise would
be to allow any person in possession of a severed surface estate to lease the
mineral estate beneath his land for the requisite statutory period and then
claim valid title to the mineral estate against the record owner by adverse
possession.”173
D. A CALL FOR REFORM
While the 2013 legislative changes were no doubt well-intended, the
ramifications were likely unexpected. Serious consideration should be
given to the requirement of possession and the important role in which it
plays in the MRTA. The Legislature should first clarify whether possession
is required for the full, unbroken chain of title, some lesser amount of time,
or if, in fact, it is only necessary at the time in which a claimant invokes the
MRTA. Defining possession of mineral interests by the minimum uses
described in the Dormant Mineral Act should be repealed, and an actual
production requirement should be reinstated. To resolve concerns about
ancient title defects in a chain, the Legislature should explore the possibility
of enacting specific curative statutes directed at the most common title
defects: tax titles, homestead conveyances without proper execution or
acknowledgment, minor defects in estate conveyances, and the like. A
definition for root deed should be added to the MRTA specifying exactly
what may or may not constitute the commencement of an unbroken chain of
title. In addition, thought should be given to the interaction of the MRTA
and other acts affecting conveyances, such as the Uniform Probate Code, so
that some level of uniformity can be maintained. Last, any such legislation
should be clear as to whether it is prospective or retroactive.
IV. ALIENATION OF HOMESTEAD
The sanctity of the family home is an American ideal. Homestead laws
seek to protect the family dwelling place from creditors of either spouse and
prevent the alienation of the homestead by one spouse without the other’s
consent. This section will examine the history and development of
homestead laws in North Dakota, the application of homestead laws to the
mineral estate, and finally consider whether such application is outmoded
given the creation of surface owner protections.

172. Sickler v. Pope, 326 N.W.2d 86, 93 (N.D. 1982).
173. Id.

370

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 90:337

A. HISTORY OF HOMESTEAD LAWS
Laws protecting the homestead trace their origins to a statute of the
Republic of Texas in 1839.174 The policy reasons for homestead laws vary
from state to state. The Supreme Court of Iowa has stated:
“The Law is based upon the idea that, as a matter of public policy,
for the promotion of the property of the state, and to render
independent and above want each citizen of the government, it is
proper he should have a home—a homestead—where his family
may be sheltered and live beyond the reach of financial misfortune
and the demands of creditors who have given credit under such
law.”175
The safeguards afforded by these homestead provisions were not
limited to the debtor but also his family. “The Convention . . . engrafted
this beneficent provision for the protection and maintenance of the wife and
children against the neglect and improvidence of the father and husband.”176
In turn, the protection of the homestead from external creditors naturally
extended to protecting spouses and dependents from internal
sources—alienation of the homestead by the owner. Early California
decisions likened these homestead rights as something akin to joint
tenancy.177 In fact, when read in conjunction with various probate code
provisions, there are several similarities.178

174. George L. Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1289 (1950).
175. Chalress v. Lamberson, 1 Clarke 435, 439 (Iowa 1855).
176. Cook v. McChristian, 4 Cal. 23, 26 (1854).
177. Taylor v. Hargous, 4 Cal. 268, 273 (1854) (“It is turned into a sort of joint tenancy,
with the right of survivorship, at least as between husband and wife, and this estate cannot be
altered or destroyed, except by the concurrence of both, in the manner provided by law.”). Taylor
was subsequently overturned in part. See Gee v. Moore, 14 Cal. 472, 477 (1859).
178. Barber v. Babel, 36 Cal. 16, 17 (1868) (“But we do not perceive why the character of
the right, as defined, does not substantially approach very near a joint tenancy, although not
created in precisely the same way, even if not a technical joint tenancy at common law. In the
homestead estate most of the unities of the joint tenancy are found, for it is created by the same
instrument and at the same time. The homestead right and the joint interests are created by the
executing, acknowledging, and recording of the declaration. The new character of the estate . . .
accruing by one and the same conveyance, (or act,) commencing at one and the same time, and
held by one and the same undivided possession. If the husband controls the property during the
coverture, it is not because he has a greater, more valuable, or different interest in the homestead
from that of the wife, but because the law has made him the head of the household and devolved
upon him the duty of management, not for his own interest merely, but for the joint benefit of
both. And since the amendment of 1862, the right of survivorship, the grand incident of joint
tenancy, is added. The main substantial difference now seems to be, the want of power in one of
the parties to sever the tenancy, or convey it all, without the concurrence of the other in the mode
prescribed. But however this may be there is a joint interest in the homestead—a joint holding, if
not a technical joint tenancy.”) (internal quotation omitted).
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North Dakota has recognized the importance of the homestead since
adopting its constitution in 1889,179 and it has equally utopian reasons for
enacting its homestead provisions:
The object of the homestead exemption law is the protection of the
family to afford an asylum for the protection and support of the
family in order that such family and children may be protected
from the enervating effects of poverty, which to a large degree is
the recruiting ground of disease and crime, and to provide an
opportunity whereby such children may be properly developed
physically, morally, and intellectually to assume and perform the
true and proper duties of citizenship, and thus strengthening the
state.180
B. DEFINITION OF HOMESTEAD
What constitutes a homestead has changed over the course of time. As
the word implies, the homestead is “the house, outbuildings and adjoining
land owned and occupied by a person or family as a residence.”181 Because
homestead provisions are ultimately designed to protect the family against
creditors, jurisdictions have necessarily debated the extent to which a debtor
is entitled to protection. This leads to important discussions on not only the
value of the homestead property, but also the extent of the area to which
one is entitled to claim. As originally enacted, North Dakota defined
homestead as follows:
Homestead Exempt. A homestead owned by either husband or
wife, not exceeding in value $5,000, consisting of a dwelling
house in which the homestead claimant resides, and all its
appurtenances, and the land on which the same is situated, shall be
exempt from judgment lien and from execution or forced sale,
except as provided in this chapter.182
In 1895, the definition of homestead was amended to limit the
homestead to not only $5,000.00, but also “if within a town plat, not
exceeding two acres in extent, and if not within a town plat, not exceeding

179. N.D. CONST. art. XVII, § 208 (1889). Article six, section twenty-two of the North
Dakota Constitution reads, in part: “The right of the debtor to enjoy the comforts and necessaries
of life shall be recognized by wholesome laws, exempting from forced sale to all heads of families
a homestead, the value of which shall be limited and defined by law.” N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 22.
180. Swingle v. Swingle, 162 N.W. 912, 912 (N.D. 1917).
181. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 850 (10th ed. 2014).
182. 1891 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 67, § 1.
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in the aggregate more than one hundred and sixty acres.183 In 1943, the
value of the homestead limitation was increased to “$8,000.00 over and
above liens or encumbrances, or both” for those homesteads located within
a town plat, and for homesteads not within a town plat the value limitation
was completely removed from the equation.184 The value limitation on
homesteads within a town plat was increased to $25,000.00 in 1951,185 and
to $40,000.00 in 1967.186 In 1977, the Legislature did away with area
limitations for both homesteads within and without of a town plat, reverting
back to a strictly value based definition and increased the allowable value to
$60,000.00.187
In 1979, the Legislature repealed archaic language
concerning the “head of family” and further increased the allowable value
to $80,000.00.188 And finally in 2009, the Legislature increased the
allowable value to $100,000.00.189 The North Dakota Century Code section
47-18-01 currently defines the homestead as follows:
The homestead of any individual, whether married or unmarried,
residing in this state consists of the land upon which the claimant
resides, and the dwelling house on that land in which the
homestead claimant resides, with all its appurtenances, and all
other improvements on the land, the total not to exceed one
hundred thousand dollars in value, over and above liens or
encumbrances or both. The homestead shall be exempt from
judgment lien and from execution or forced sale, except as
otherwise provided in this chapter. The homestead may not
embrace different lots or tracts of land unless the lots or tracts of
land are contiguous. For purposes of this section, “contiguous”
means two or more tracts of real property which share a common
point or which would share a common point but for an intervening
road or right of way.190
Notably, the title of the current statutory provision continues to refer to
area—something that has not been present in the definition of homestead
since 1977.

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

N.D.R.C. § 3605 (1895).
N.D.R.C. § 47-1801 (1943).
1951 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 277, § 1.
1967 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 362, § 1.
1979 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 488, § 7.
1979 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 489, § 1.
2009 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 276, § 8.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-01 (2013).
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C. ALIENATION OF HOMESTEAD
Like most jurisdictions in the United States, North Dakota, has codified
statutes that seek to protect the family home from alienation by the owner
without the consent of his or her spouse. North Dakota first enacted
homestead laws in 1891 as part of the Second Session of Laws. The first
provision concerning alienation of the homestead was found in chapter 67,
section 4 as follows: “§ Acknowledgement of Husband And Wife. The
homestead of a married person cannot be conveyed or incumbered [sic]
unless the instrument by which it is conveyed or incumbered [sic] is
executed and acknowledged by both husband and wife.”191 The provision
has changed little over the course of time.192 The current version has been
modified to remove any limitation on alienation of the homestead based
upon value: “The homestead of a married person, without regard to the
value thereof, cannot be conveyed or encumbered unless the instrument by
which it is conveyed or encumbered is executed and acknowledged by both
the husband and wife.”193 Courts have interpreted a conveyance of the
homestead to include a conveyance of any form of interest including sales
contracts,194 contract for deeds,195 leases,196 mortgages,197 and outright
conveyances of fee simple absolute.198
A perplexing conflict exists between the current definition of
homestead and the restrictions on alienation. The basis for determining the
extent of homestead property is value.199 However, a conveyance of
homestead property completely disregards this limiting factor, resulting in
the question of what exactly cannot be conveyed without being executed
and acknowledged by husband and wife. For instance, assume that O owns
free and clear the NE¼ consisting of 160 acres and valued at $10,000.00 per
acre. Assume further that within the SE¼NE¼, O has a modest
three-bedroom ranch style home with a two-car garage confined to one acre
with an unencumbered value of $90,000.00. Pursuant to North Dakota

191. 1891 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 67, § 4.
192. See, e.g., N.D.R.C. § 5608 (1913); N.D.R.C. § 5052 (1905); N.D.R.C. §3608 (1899);
N.D.R.C. §3608 (1895).
193. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-05 (2013).
194. Silander v. Gronna, 108 N.W. 544 (N.D. 1906).
195. Larson v. Cole, 33 N.W.2d 325 (N.D. 1948).
196. Jessen v. Pingel, 257 N.W. 2 (N.D. 1934); but see Wegner v. Lubenow, 95 N.W. 442
(N.D. 1903).
197. Grotberg v. First Nat. Bank, 210 N.W. 21 (N.D. 1926).
198. Severtson v. Peoples, 148 N.W. 1054 (N.D. 1914).
199. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-01 (2013).
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Century Code section 48-18-01,200 the homestead could be limited to the
one acre with home and the remainder subject to execution of judgment and
division pursuant to North Dakota Century Code section 48-18-12.201
However, if O is married, it is unclear whether O is prohibited from
conveying, for instance, the one acre on which the home is located—the
SE¼NE¼—or the full NE¼ without joinder of his or her spouse. This issue
is compounded further if O also owns the NW¼, a contiguous parcel, and
could claim the entire N½ as being subject to North Dakota Century Code
section 47-18-05.
It is plausible that the reference to value was included to prevent the
argument that a $500,000.00 home located on a one-acre platted parcel was
somehow exempt from the requirements of North Dakota Century Code
section 47-18-05 due to the fact that it exceeds the $100,000.00 allowable
value of a homestead; but if that is indeed the case, it has other
implications. Our neighboring states do not have such provisions for
disregarding value. However, both Minnesota and South Dakota limit the
homestead by area.202
Prior to various legislative amendments, the conflict between the
definition of homestead and alienation of homestead did not exist. In
Severtson v. Peoples, a deed executed by Ernest S. Severtson and Pearle E.
Severtson, husband and wife, purported to convey “11 lots in Block 7, and
7 lots in [B]lock 4 in the village of New Rockford” to the defendant. 203 The
plaintiffs, however, alleged that the wife did not acknowledge the deed and
that she executed it under coercion, intimidation, duress, and undue
influence by the defendant.The trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs
and ruled:
[a]s to the homestead interest of said Pearle E. Severtson and
Ernest S. Severtson, her husband, in said premises as defined by
law, which said homestead interest is to be ascertained as provided
200. Id.
201. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-12 (2013).
202. See MINN. STAT. §§ 507.02, 510.02 (2014) (providing that a homestead may include
any quantity of land not to exceed 160 acres or a value of $390,000.00 or if used for agricultural
purposes $975,000.00). Until 2007, Minnesota also distinguished between platted lots within a
city and un-platted lands located outside of a city by defining homestead as up to a one-half acre
platted lot or 160 acres of un-platted lands. See also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-31-4 (2013) (“If
within a town plat the homestead must not exceed one acre in extent, and if not within a town plat,
it must not embrace in the aggregate more than one hundred sixty acres.”); MONT. CODE ANN. §§
70-32-104, 70-32-301 (2013).
203. Severtson, 148 N.W. at 1054. The definition of homestead at the time of Severtson,
constituted two acres within a platted town site, with a value that does not exceed $5,000.00. Id.
at 1056.
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by law, and that said deed be decreed to convey no interest or
estate in, or lien or incumbrance [sic] upon said homestead interest
in said property.204
On appeal the North Dakota Supreme Court was unable to determine
what the trial court intended, noting that the trial court failed to make a
determination of what constituted the homestead and appeared to leave such
a finding for a later time and proceeding. In its decision, the Severtson
court cited Chief Justice Bartholomew’s opinion in Foogman v. Patterson:
“While the party may select his homestead from any portion of a
tract much larger than the law allows for a homestead, it
necessarily follows that no homestead can be identified until the
selection is made.” . . . It is ‘the homestead as created, defined, and
limited by law’ that is absolutely exempt. We have already seen
what that means. A mere floating homestead right, unattached to
any land in a manner that can identify the . . . homestead, cannot
create an absolute exemption in land that may subsequently be
designated and identified as a homestead.205
The court then concluded that a deed will not be adjudged to be void in
toto when it covers not only the homestead but also other lands. It will, in
such a case, be declared void merely as to the homestead. In offering
direction to the trial court, the North Dakota Supreme Court noted that the
plaintiff alleged to reside only upon the lots in block 7 and that those lots in
block 4 were not contiguous.206 Because they were not contiguous, there
was no possibility of finding that the homestead covered all of the described
lands.
On rehearing, the court was presented with the very argument that the
Legislature has now constructed—that the area and value of the homestead
of plaintiffs are wholly immaterial when the homestead is conveyed without
the execution and acknowledgement of both spouses where the rights of
creditors are in no way involved.207 The court noted that the Legislature
limited the homestead not only to creditors, but also to heirs.208 In view of
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1057 (citing Foogman v. Patterson, 83 N.W. 15 (N.D. 1900)).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1058.
208. Id. The current application of homestead limitations to heirs is found at North Dakota
Century Code section 30-16-09, which provides:
If the court finds that the homestead selected in an estate exceeds in value any
limitation fixed by law and that the property cannot be divided without material injury,
the order setting it apart must determine the amount of such excess, and thereafter the
property to the extent of the excess so determined may be subjected, after all of the
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such policy, the court correctly asked “how can it be seriously contended
that no such restrictions or limitations were contemplated in favor of
vendees?”209 There appears no basis for arguing that North Dakota Century
Code section 47-18-05 was intended to expand the definition of homestead
when the underlying public policy rational is to preserve the homestead for
both spouses against the decisions of a single spouse.
It is impossible for a title examiner to make any conclusions as to the
size of homestead when the homestead is defined by value. The North
Dakota Title Standards presume that any conveyance of the surface includes
homestead property.210 The general rule applied by practitioners and those
associated with real estate closings has been that it takes “one to buy, two to
sell.” In other words, if real property is being conveyed, the surface is
involved, and the owner is married, both husband and wife must sign
regardless of whether the real property constitutes homestead or not.211 It is
a simple bright-line rule that provides the protection necessary to insure that
such a conveyance is valid. However, it also avoids confronting the
ambiguity in the definition of the current statute.
D. ALIENATION OF THE HOMESTAD MINERAL ESTATE
At common law, the owner of land in fee simple absolute was said to
own the land from heaven to hell.212 The landowner alone was entitled to
prospect for, sever, and remove from the land anything found on or beneath
the surface.213 A mineral interest is a real property interest created in
place.214 It is well established that a general conveyance of land without
exception or reservation conveys to the grantee both the surface and mineral
other available property has been exhausted, to the payment of debts in the same
manner as other property.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-16-09 (2013).
209. Severtson, 148 N.W. at 1058-59.
210. N.D. TITLE STANDARDS § 2-02 (N.D. State Bar Ass’n 2012). This standard requires
evidence of marital status or evidence that the property conveyed did not constitute the grantor’s
homestead when a conveyance has been recorded and no spouse has joined or where marital status
is not indicated anywhere in the deed. Id.
211. An alternative, if the real property being conveyed is in fact non-homestead, is to
execute and record an affidavit consistent with the requirements of North Dakota Century Code
sections 47-19-11 and 47-19-12 evidencing that the premises do not constitute the homestead of
the grantor or the grantor’s family. Such affidavit may be executed solely by the grantor, without
joinder of the grantor’s spouse; however, it is insufficient to include the same recitals within the
conveyance itself. N.D. TITLE STANDARDS § 2-02 (N.D. State Bar Ass’n 2012).
212. See PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, OIL AND GAS LAW § 202, (9th ed.
2011) (“Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos.”).
213. Id.
214. Texaro Oil Co. v. Mosser, 299 N.W.2d 191, 194 (N.D. 1980). See also Schulz v.
Hauck, 312 N.W.2d 360, 361 (1981); Payne v. A. M. Fruh Co. 98 N.W.2d 27 (N.D. 1959).
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estates.215 However, a conveyance of minerals “gives to the mineral owner
the incidental right of entering, occupying, and making such use of the
surface lands as is reasonably necessary in exploring, mining, removing,
and marketing the minerals.”216 The same holds true for the typical oil and
gas lease.217 The result is that the mineral estate is deemed to be the
dominant estate.218
The underlying question, then, is whether or not a mineral deed or lease
can be or should be deemed to be an alienation of homestead. In Franklin
Land Co. v. Wea Gas, Coal & Oil, Co., the Kansas Supreme Court
addressed this very question.219 The court held “that a lease of a
homestead, under which the lessee takes possession of the premises in such
a way as to interfere with the possession and enjoyment by the wife of the
homestead, is such an alienation of the homestead as, under the constitution
and statute . . . requires joint consent of the husband and wife.”220 The
court, after analyzing the lease, determined that the lessee was lawfully
entitled to occupy as much or all of the surface as he found “necessary [in
order] to erect thereon derricks and enginehouses; to prospect for gas, coal,
oil, or any other mineral substance; and if anything valuable is found, to
erect buildings in which to store such product.”221 Thus, the key factor is
not the extraction of minerals from the property, but to what extent the
surface is impacted by such activities.
Similarly, the Texas Civil Appellate Court found that a contract
conveying all the oil, gas, coal, and other minerals, together with right of
ingress and egress and reserving an undivided one-tenth to the grantor, was
invalid. The court noted “the right to construct machinery for the boring
and digging of wells, and the right to erect derricks, build tanks, and place
boilers, engines and machinery . . . would destroy the homestead use of the
property, or to at least a portion of the same” and that the contract did not
limit the amount of land the company could take for such purposes.222
The conveyance of homestead property and the underlying minerals
has appeared before the North Dakota Supreme Court on a number of
215. Schulz, 312 N.W.2d at 361 (citing Kadrmas v. Sauvageau, 188 N.W.2d 753, 755 (N.D.
1971)).
216. Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543, 550 (N.D. 1973).
217. Feland v. Placid Oil Co., 171 N.W.2d 829, 834 (N.D. 1969).
218. Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 136 (N.D. 1979); see also Ernest R. Fleck,
Severed Mineral Interests, 51 N.D. L. REV. 369 (1974).
219. Franklin Land Co. v. Wea Gas, Coal & Oil Co., 23 P. 630 (Kan. 1890).
220. Id. at 632.
221. Id.
222. S. Oil Co. v. Colquitt, 69 S.W. 169, 170-71 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902).
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occasions—seemingly always in the context of fraud. In Dixon v.
Kaufman, Clarence and Elizabeth Dixon executed a mineral deed to W. C.
Kaufman, Jr., and the Dixon’s alleged that they were led to believe the
document signed was an oil lease in which they would receive an eighth
royalty.223 The grantee’s agent took the instrument “to a notary public who
had previously taken acknowledgements for the Dixons and was familiar
with their signatures.”224 Although disputed by Elizabeth Dixon, the notary
claimed to have confirmed with her by telephone that she and her husband
executed the document.225 The notary completed the certificate of
acknowledgment attached to the deed.226 The deed included the SW¼ of
Section 31, Township 160 North, Range 82 West, being the plaintiff’s
homestead.227
The North Dakota Supreme Court found that any
conveyance of homestead property without proper acknowledgement was
void, relying solely on a similar case from Illinois, Logue v. Von Almen.228
Two similar cases often cited for the proposition that a mineral
conveyance of homestead property that does not comply with the
requirements of North Dakota Century Code section 47-18-05 is void are
Hoffer v. Crawford and Dockter v. Crawford.229 In both cases, the plaintiffs
alleged that mineral deeds to defendant, D. W. Crawford, were obtained by
fraud.230 In each case, the mineral deeds conveyed minerals underlying the
plaintiffs’ homesteads as well as other lands.231 The husband and wife in
both cases executed the mineral deed at their homes and did not appear
before a notary public.232 Crawford conceded that neither mineral deed was

223. Dixon v. Kaufman, 58 N.W.2d 797, 804 (N.D. 1953).
224. Id. at 804.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 800.
228. Id. (citing Logue v. Von Almen, 40 N.E.2d 73 (Ill. 1941)). While Logue fails to
analyze why a mineral deed that conveys an interest in homestead property would be void, it was
well established in Illinois that such was the case. The Supreme Court of Illinois addressed this
issue in Bruner v. Hicks, where the court found that an oil and gas lease that:
assigns the right to use, possess, and enjoy a portion of said premises for the purpose
of mining and operating for oil and gas, and laying pipe lines and building tanks,
stations, and structures thereon to take care of said products, deprived [the homestead
claimants] of a portion of their homestead, and, said homestead not having been
waived or released in accordance with the terms of the statute, said lease was void.
82 N.E. 888, 891 (Ill. 1907).
229. Hoffer v. Crawford, 65 N.W.2d 625 (N.D. 1954); Dockter v. Crawford, 65 N.W.2d 691
(N.D. 1954).
230. Dockter, 65 N.W.2d at 692.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 693.
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effective as to homestead property.233 Consequently, the North Dakota
Supreme Court held, without need for further discussion, that no title to the
minerals in or under the homesteads passed to D. W. Crawford.234
E. HOMESTEAD APPLICATION IN LIGHT OF NORTH DAKOTA SURFACE
PROTECTION LAWS
It is important to remember that the body of case law first asserting
homestead protection to minerals is derived from an era that offered little
credence to the surface owner. The images of Boiler Avenue in Spindletop
lined with as many derricks as physically possible evidence the tremendous
impact that drilling practices of the time had on the surface estate. 235 It was
said that the derricks on Spindletop “were so close together that workmen
laid planks from one wooden structure to the next so they could make a
quick escape when an oil fire flared up.”236 It was an era in which the
mineral developers were allowed unrestricted use of as much of the surface
as necessary for their operations. The concept of a dominant mineral estate,
however, began to evolve.237 The North Dakota Supreme Court adopted the
“accommodation doctrine” in 1979, holding that the owner of a dominant
mineral estate must make reasonable accommodations when using the
surface for developing and producing the minerals on particular land.238
North Dakota first enacted the Surface Owner Protection Act in
1975.239 The Oil and Gas Production Damage Compensation statues were
later enacted in 1979.240
The Oil and Gas Production Damage
Compensation Act provides for numerous safeguards for the surface
owner.241 North Dakota Century Code section 38-11.1-04 requires the
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Rance L. Craft, Of Reservoir Hogs and Pelt Fiction: Defending the Ferae Natura
Analogy Between Petroleum and Wildlife, 44 EMORY L.J. 697, 701 (1995). Discovery of oil at the
Spindletop salt dome near Beaumont, Texas led to the drilling of 440 wells on 125 acres in a
year’s time. The overproduction of Spindletop led Captain Anthony F. Lucas, who made its first
discovery in 1901, to note: “The cow was milked too hard, and moreover she was not milked
intelligently.” Id.
236. Id. at 700 n.19 (quoting RICHARD O’CONNOR, THE OIL BARONS: MEN OF GREED AND
GRANDEUR 81 (1971)).
237. See Fleck, supra note 218 (“The severance of the mineral estate from the surface estate
in land has caused some problems, litigation and legislation over the years, but these were
minimized by general acceptance of the doctrine of mineral estate dominance. Today, however,
there appears to be an erosion of this concept and an increased concern for the rights of the surface
owner.”).
238. Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 136 (N.D. 1979).
239. See 1975 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 321, §1; N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 38-18 (2013).
240. See 1979 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 396, §4; N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 38-11.1 (2013).
241. See generally N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 38-11.1 (2013).
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mineral developer to pay the surface owner for damages sustained, lost land
value, lost use of and access to the surface owner’s land, and lost value of
improvements caused by drilling operations.242 A surface owner who
obtains his or her water supply from underground sources is entitled to the
cost of making repairs, alterations, or construction that will ensure the
delivery of water in equal quality and quantity as before drilling
operations.243 The surface owner is further entitled to payments “for loss of
agricultural production and income caused by oil and gas production and
completion operations,”244 damages sustained for loss of agricultural
production caused by mining activity, and to the fair market value of a farm
building that comes within five hundred feet of a surface mining
operation.245
In addition to compensation, various permitting requirements have
been enacted for not only the drilling and production of oil and gas, but for
surface mining as well. North Dakota Century Code section 38-08-5(2)
provides safeguards to surface owners by prohibiting the issuance of a
drilling permit within five hundred feet of an occupied dwelling, except in
limited circumstances. 246 If such permit is issued “within one thousand
feet of an occupied dwelling,” the owner of such dwelling may request the
operator to place “the location of all flares, tanks, and treaters utilized in
connection with the permitted well” farther away from the dwelling than the
well bore if such location can be accommodated reasonably within the well
pad.247 Similarly, before the Public Service Commission may issue a
permit to surface mine land, each surface owner must provide statements of
consent, a mineral lease, or surface lease from the surface owner.248 No
surface coal mining is permitted within five hundred feet of any occupied
dwelling unless approved by the owner thereof.249 Finally, areas within five
242. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-04 (2013).
243. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-06 (2013); see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.2-07
(2013).
244. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-08.1 (2013); see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.2-04
(2009).
245. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-18-07 (1) (2013).
246. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-05(2) (2013).
247. Id.
248. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-18-06 (2013). “Surface owner” is defined as the person or
persons who presently have valid title to the surface of the land, their successors, assigns, or
predecessors in title, regardless of whether or not a portion of the land surface is occupied for a
residence. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-18-05(10) (2013). This definition excludes a spouse who does
not have title.
249. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-14.1-07 (2013); but see N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-14.1-08 (2013)
(“The designation of an area as unsuitable for all types or certain types of surface coal mining
operations does not prevent the mineral exploration of such an area.”).
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hundred feet of an inhabited rural residence must be considered exclusion
areas for energy conversion facilities and energy transmission facilities
unless waived by the owner.250
While some may contend that the protections afforded to North Dakota
surface owners remain inadequate, one cannot deny that the protections
enacted satisfy the public policy rational for all homesteads—regardless of
whether the homestead is located on lands with unified estates or lands in
which the minerals have been severed. In fact, as surface protections have
evolved, it is difficult to justify inclusion of the mineral estate in the
definition of homestead. There appears little reasoning for treating unified
estates any different than severed estates.
By removing minerals from the definition of homestead, common
errors in mineral conveyances may be eliminated. Frequently instruments
attempt to circumvent the homestead requirements by identifying the
grantor as a “married person dealing in his or her sole and separate
property” when in fact the grantor’s spouse must still execute and
acknowledge the instrument. Oftentimes in an attempt to cure a void
homestead conveyance a party will obtain a ratification or separate deed
executed and acknowledged from the originally-omitted spouse alone.
However, a separate instrument from the non-joining spouse does not meet
the requirements of N.D. Cent. Code sect. 47-18-05; both spouses must
execute and acknowledge the curative instrument.251 This is not to suggest
that the definition should be amended to exclude minerals to rectify poor
drafting on behalf of those who should have greater understanding of the
laws of North Dakota, but it does reflect the all-too-common belief that a
sole owner of minerals has the right to convey without limitation. Until and
unless such a change is made to the definition of homestead, best practices
require practitioners and landmen to be diligent in obtaining proper
execution and acknowledgement from both husband and wife of any
conveyance of a mineral interest in which the grantor also owns a surface
interest in the conveyed lands.

250. N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-22-05.1 (2013). Notably, “owner” is not defined by the statute
and does not appear to require the owner’s spouse to also waive such restrictions; nor does it
require waiver from the actual inhabitant. The right to enter upon the property for such purposes
however would be a conveyance requiring the execution and acknowledgement by a spouse if the
property is deemed to be homestead.
251. See N.D. TITLE STANDARDS § 2-05 (N.D. State Bar Ass’n 2012); see also Portland
Credit Union v. Hauge, 169 N.W.2d 106 (N.D. 1969); Neset v. Rudman, 74 N.W.2d 826 (N.D.
1956).
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V. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of after-acquired property, the Marketable Record Title
Act, and alienation of homestead are three issues common to any real estate
attorney’s practice. A cursory understanding of any of these issues may
give practitioners or lawmakers an erroneous sense of enlightenment.
Without fully understanding the history, the policy rational, and the
development of both statutory and case law of each topic, practitioners and
lawmakers alike are prone to encountering unintended consequences. Just
as the portion of the iceberg lurking underneath the surface of the water
threatens passing ships with their demise, the application of these topics
without a sufficient understanding of each, especially in relationship to
mineral interests, will result in serious and substantial consequences. Thus,
practitioners must give serious consideration to the 2013 legislative
amendments to the doctrine of after-acquired title and the Marketable
Record Title Act and must not only understand the implications of the
amendments, but also address the consequences created by the changes.
Legislators must give further consideration to the changes they enacted and
decide whether or not such amendments accomplished the intended goal
without creating unintended consequences and without inflicting harm upon
the status of real property titles. The methodical and well-reasoned
evolution of laws protecting surface owners from the exploration and
development of mineral resources should cause lawmakers to question
whether or not the century-old application of homestead laws remain
applicable to mineral interests.
Property law and real estate titles are necessarily bound to
predictability and certainty.252 Any changes made to well-established real
property law must first be painstakingly analyzed and thoughtfully enacted.
Practitioners too must master the nuances and develop a firm understanding
of the complex issues that lie hidden beneath the surface of a cursory
review. Only then will unintended consequences—the collision with the
unseen portion of the iceberg—be avoided.

252. Lario Oil & Gas Co. v. EOG Res., Inc., 2013 ND 98, ¶ 17, 832 N.W.2d 49, 54
(VandeWalle, C.J., specially concurring); James v. Griffin, 2001 ND 90, ¶ 15, 626 N.W.2d 704,
709; see also Owen L. Anderson & Charles T. Edin, The Growing Uncertainty of Real Estate
Titles, 65 N.D. L. REV. 1 (1989).

